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 ABSTRACT 
The recent Brexit episode is being interpreted in some quarters as an anti-globalisation 
backlash. Free trade does not promise gains for all without a proper compensating mechanism 
that allows winners to bribe the losers. Also standard prediction of trade theory does point 
towards increasing wage inequality for the relatively skill abundant developed world. 
Theoretical discussion on compensating mechanism that addresses inequality is rare in trade 
literature. In a simple HOS model we consider tax policies that keep the pre-trade degree of 
inequality unchanged between skilled and unskilled workers. We discuss the problem of 
existence of such an inequality-neutral tax rate that generates a positive increment in the after 
tax skilled wage and unskilled wage.  Such a mechanism exists and is independent of whether 
the tax is progressive or proportional. 
JEL Classification:F11; J31; D63; H20; H23 
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Free trade under ideal conditions generates overall gains from trade increasing real 
national income. This is a standard proposition in international trade. However, 
there are distributional consequences. Some gain and some lose. The general 
proposition is that gainers can bribe the losers. Thus political authorities should be 
able to generate compensation mechanisms to help the losers. As real income as a 
whole increases relative to autarky, potentially everyone can be made better off. Thus 
free trade benefits all in the sense that even those who do not gain by trade, can be 
compensated by the State, if needed. This is as much trade theory can tell us.  
International trade theory does not suggest anything to take care of rising inequality 
after trade. If trade increases wage inequality between the skilled and the unskilled, 
absolute compensation is very unlikely to do the job. Theory of trade does not give 
any clue as to how gains from trade may be redistributed to contain rising inequality, 
if any. Hence one needs to integrate public finance with trade i.e. to explore the 
feasibility of a proper tax-transfer mechanism which this paper intends to do. 
Interfacing trade and public finance, for understanding both problems better,  is 
necessary as mentioned by Atkinsonሺ2009ሻ, and very recently elegantly elaborated in 
Pol Antras et al.ሺ2015ሻ	who have gone into the details of welfare consequences of tax 
policies in an extended trade model when such taxes create distortions. However, 
they do not discuss this elementary case i.e. whether a compensation mechanism 
which keeps inequality in check and increases after-tax income of skilled labor is at 
all feasible in the standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model. 
The traditional gains from trade theorem is directly related to Pareto criterion. If a 
change makes no one worse off and at least one better off, the change is Pareto 
superior to no change. If aggregate real income increases in free trade relative to 
autarky, one can distribute the gain in a way to make everyone as well off as before 
and at least one better off. Economists were concerned with the decline in the 
absolute value of real income and keeping everyone at the same level of welfare as in 
autarky was good enough policy to counter agitation against trade. The problem is 
that modern trade theorists could not anticipate that status quo in terms of the initial 
level of income was not good enough since everyone except the person who is better 
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off, will feel deprived as his relative position will worsen even if their absolute income 
remains pegged at the old level. Inequality has become more of a concern than to 
remain as well off as before. Those who directly gain from trade need to be taxed 
more heavily if one has to satisfy an inequality-neutral condition given that the 
degree of inequality remains the same as before, which necessarily means that those 
who are hurt by trade are duly compensated. At the same time one has to make sure 
that those who have directly gained from trade are not losing. This will put an upper 
bound on the quantum of redistribution. Redistributive policy must not make the tax 
payers worse off relative to autarky. Thus we introduce a new welfare criterion 
involving inequality that is an extension of the famous Pareto criterion. This is stated 
as follows. 
Consider two social situations A and B. A will promise greater social welfare than B 
iff taxes , collected from better off people in A relative to B, are transferred to the 
worse off people in A relative to B to keep the degree of inequality in A same as in B  
and the tax payers have a greater after tax real income. We apply this principle in our 
exercise on tax policy in an open economy. 
The specific purpose of this paper is to look for distribution neutral income tax rate 
under free trade as compared to autarky. It is now more or less recognised that the 
wage inequality between the skilled and unskilled workers in the developed countries 
has widened considerably along with the rising volume of trade. One can refer to a 
huge literature dealing theoretically and empirically with the problem in the context 
of relatively rich skill and capital abundant countries. A representative sample will be 
Krugmanሺ2000ሻ, Davisሺ1998,	 2011ሻ,Jones and Engermanሺ1996ሻ,Feenstraሺ2010ሻ 
etc. 
Very recently the Brexit episode has pointed towards reluctance towards integration 
and the voting pattern suggested that relatively affluent and educated Britons voted 
to remain within the EU and relatively blue coloured population wanted an exit. 
Although there is nothing conclusive yet in terms of the pattern of such decision, one 
needs to worry about import competition and outsourcing affected employment and 
wage situation in the rich countries. Even if by aggregate measure trade benefits a 
nation, the affected groups would continue to suffer and agitate if sufficient 
compensation is not made available to them at least in the short run to cope up with 
the adjustments even if trade guarantees longer run benefits. Adjustment problems 
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in trade and short run and long run effects of outsourcing have been discussed by 
Chakrabarty (2004), Marjit,Beladi and Chakrabarty (2004), Marjit and Mukherjee 
(2008), Bandyopadhyay, Marjit and Yang (2014) etc. 
It goes without saying that in a democracy rising inequality is a critical issue to the 
political competitors and without proper attention such inequality can jeopardize 
good economic strategies. Thus it seems natural that one would look for 
compensating policies to counter rising inequality, due to trade. i.e. due to increasing 
export of skilled products and import of cheaper unskilled items from abroad.  
In terms of a text book model of international trade and with a standard tax-transfer 
mechanism we try to characterize distribution neutral tax policy which taxes skilled 
workers and transfers the proceeds to the unskilled workers. We find out the 
necessary increase in the tax rate which keeps the wage distribution unchanged at 
the pre-trade level and try to characterize such a tax in terms of underlying 
parameters. The interesting part of the problem is to check the existence of a 
distribution or inequality neutral tax-rate that is low enough to increase net of tax 
skilled wage relative to autarky. We argue that such a win-win situation will exist. We 
consider proportional as well as progressive tax rates and condition for existence is 
met independent of such difference. 
Section 2 develops the model and results. Section 3 provides a general perspective 
and the last section concludes. 
Section 2:      Model and Results 
Two products X and Y use skilled and unskilled labor for production via CRS and 
diminishing marginal productivity conditions.   X is skilled labor intensive and Y is 
unskilled labor intensive. The competitive price equation with Y as the numeraire 
yields 
ݓ௦	ܽ௦௫ ൅ ݓܽ௟௫ ൌ ݌    ሺ1ሻ	
ݓ௦ܽ௦௬ ൅ ݓܽ௟௬ ൌ 1		 	 	 	 ሺ2ሻ 
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The symbols have usual meaning a la Jones ሺ1965ሻ. The country concerned is skilled 
labor abundant and as trade opens up with	݌ෝ ൐ 0,			′ ∧′	denotes percentage change. 
ݓෝ௦ൌߠ௅௬ ௣ො|ఏ|	and	ݓෝ ൌ	‐ߠ௦௬
௣ො
|ఏ|								ሺ3ሻ	
With|ߠ| ൌ ߠ௦௫ െ ߠ௦௬ ൐ 0		by the factor intensity assumption.                         
This is the standard Stolper-Samuelson result. Opening up to trade increases 
inequality betweenݓ௦	and		ݓ,with ݓෝ௦ ൐ 0, ݓෝ ൏ 0. We now turn to the welfare 
policy of the government to compensate the unskilled workers. 
Suppose the govt. taxes the skilled workers by taxing ݓ௦ with a proportional tax ݐand 
redistributes the tax proceeds to the unskilled workers.If ܵ	andܮ are the numbers of 
skilled and unskilled workers respectively then the after transfer wage to the 
unskilled worker is given by (4) 
ݓ෥	ൌ	ݓ ൅ ݐ ௪ೞ	.ௌ௅ 	ሺ4ሻ	
and after tax wage rate of the skilled labor is  
ݓ௦෦ൌ	ݓ௦ሺ1 െ ݐሻ			ሺ5ሻ	
We can easily prove the following proposition. 
Proposition 1: If ࢚ is kept unchanged, increase in	࢙࢝will be 
enough to compensate for a decline in	࢝		iff	ࣂࡸ࢟ ൒ 	ࣅ, 
where	ࣅ	ൌ	 ࢝࢝ା࢚࢙࢝ࡿࡸ  
Proof:ݓ෥෡ ൌ ߣݓෝ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߣሻݓ௦ෞ      ሺ6ሻ	
ൌ	ݓෝ௦ െ ߣሺݓෝ௦ െ ݓෝሻ	
ൌ	 ௣ො|ఏ| ൣߠ௅௬ െ 	ߣሺߠ௦௬ ൅ ߠ௅௬ሻ൧	
ൌ	 ௣ො|ఏ| ሺߠ௅௬ െ ߣሻ	ሺ	7ሻ	
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If	ߠ௅௬ ൒ 	ߣ,increase in ݓ௦	due to trade provides full compensation to the unskilled 
workers for the initial loss due to trade. Thus, if the objective is to insulate the 
unskilled wage, a high ߠ௅௬	or	low	λshould be desirable. Following observations are 
in order. 
If initial tax rate is fairly low, then	ߣ	will be close to 1 and asߠ௅௬ ൏ 1,with the same ݐ,  
govt. will not be able to compensate the loss. Such critical	ݐ, , say ݐ	is solved as 
follows.  
For ߠ௅௬=ߣ ⇒ ߠܮݕ ൌ	 ݓݓ൅ݐݓݏ	ܵܮ  
Or,ݐ ൌ ݐ ൌ 	 ሺଵିఏಽ೤ሻఏಽ೤ೢೞೢ 	.ೄಽ	ሺ8ሻ	
Thus initial tax rate has to be equal to ݐ	for	ݓ෥෡ ൌ 0.		Note that such a	ݐ	depends on 
initial relative wageቀ௪ೞ௪ ቁ.	Higher initial	
ݓݏ		
ݓ 	will reduce	ݐത, because there is more to 
redistribute. Very high value of		ܮܵ	will demand a much higher initial tax rate to be in 
place for neutralizing the impact on ݓ. The next step is to consider the case when 
raising w is not enough and the govt. tries to contain inequality. 
 
Distribution-Neutral tax rate 
We shall consider the case when the govt. worries about the inequality between after 
tax skilled wage and transfer supported unskilled wage. Thus the measure is given 
by	ݓ෥ ݏݓ෥ 	instead of	ݓݏݓ . To start with before trade there was an initial value of	ݓݏ෦ݓ෥  and the 
govt. looks at the post trade value of		ݓ෥ݏݓ෥ . Note that even if ݐ	is kept unchanged, 
increase in ݓ௦by itself will raise income of the unskilled. But let us see to what extent. 
Proposition 2: If ࢚	is kept unchanged, (࢝෥෡࢙‐࢝෥෡ሻ	 ൐ 0	i.e. inequality 
must increase. 
Proof: We know ݓ෥෡  = ௣ො|ఏ| ሺߠ௅௬ െ ߣሻfor ̂ݐ	ൌ0ሺ9ሻ	
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Hence	ሺݓ෥෡ ݏ 	െ ݓ෥෡ሻ ൌ 	ߠܮݕ ݌ෝ|ߠ| െ	 ݌ෝ|ߠ| ሺߠܮݕ െ ߣሻ 
   =  ߣ ௣ො|ఏ| ൐ 0						ࡽࡱࡰ. 
Proposition 2 suggests that to counter rising inequality ݐ	must increase. 
Let us now consider the problem of existence of a distribution-neutral tax rate ݐ௡ 
such that it satisfies two conditions.  
ሺݓ෥෡௦- ݓ෥෡) =0	ሺ10ሻ							and						ݓ෥෡௦ ൐ 0		ሺ11ሻ	
 (10) implies that the degree of inequality is kept at the initial level neutralising the 
trade impact. (11) implies that after tax skilled wage is still greater under trade.  
ݓ෥෡௦ ൌ ݓෝ௦	‐	̂ݐ ௧ሺଵି௧ሻ			ሺ12ሻ 
ݓ෥෡ ൌ ߣݓෝ	൅	ሺ1 െ ߣሻሺ̂ݐ ൅ ݓෝ௦ሻ	ሺ13ሻ 
Now	ሺݓ෥෡௦- ݓ෥෡ሻ ൌ 0 ⇒ ݓෝ௦ െ	 ̂ݐ ௧ሺଵି௧ሻ െ 	ߣݓෝ െ ሺ1 െ ߣሻሺ̂ݐ ൅	ݓෝ௦ሻ	ൌ0	
																														Or,				̂ݐ	ൌ	 ఒሺ௪ෝೞି௪ෝሻሺଵିఒሻା ೟ሺభష೟ሻ	
			ൌ	 ఒሺ
೛ෝ
|ഇ|ሻ
ሺଵିఒሻା ೟ሺభష೟ሻ
																			ሺ14ሻ	
The neutral tax rate ݐ௡ is given by ݐ௡ ൌ ݐሺ1 ൅ ̂ݐሻ 
ݓෝ௦–̂ݐ ௧ሺଵି௧ሻ ൐ 0	ሾfrom	ሺ11ሻ	&	ሺ12ሻሿ	
⇒ ߠ௅௬ ௣ො|ఏ| ൐ ̂ݐ
௧
ሺଵି௧ሻሺ15ሻ	
Substituting	for	̂ݐfrom	ሺ14ሻ	we	get	
ߠ௅௬ ൐ ఒ௧ఒ௧ାሺଵିఒሻ			ሺ16ሻ	
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Equation	 ሺ16ሻ	summarises two conditions.  First, inequality is contained at the pre 
trade level and such taxation is fair in the sense that the skilled workers’ after-tax 
income has been allowed to grow. But the problem is that whether such condition is 
likely to be satisfied, which will guarantee the existence of a	ݐ݊.	 	
We simplify condition	ሺ16ሻ	further	
ߠ௅௬ ൐ ఒ௧ఒ௧ାሺଵିఒሻ ൌ 	
ଵ
ଵାభ೟ሺ
భ
ഊିଵሻ
			ሺ17ሻ	
From the definition of	ߣ ≡ 	 ݓݓ൅ݐݓݏܵܮ 	,		equation	ሺ17ሻ	boils	down	to		
ߠ௅௬ ൐ ଵଵାభ೟ሺ௧ೢೞೢ .ೄಽሻ ൌ 	
ଵ
ଵାೢೞೢ .
ೄ
ಽ
		ሺ18ሻ	
	
Proposition (3) 
Such a tax- transfer mechanism will always exist. 
	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Proof : Following from	ሺ18ሻ	that does not contain t, a little manipulation yields that 
	 for	ሺ18ሻ	to hold	ݓݏݓ ൐ ൬ 1ߠܮݕ െ 1൰
ܮ
ݏ		ሺ19ሻ	
This	boils	down	to	ሺS/Lሻ		൐		ሺ	asy	/	asy	ሻ						
Note	that	as	the	country	is	a	typical	HOS	economy	exporting	skill	intensive	
good	 and	 is	 incompletely	 specialized	 this	 must	 hold	 as	 the	 endowment	
ratio	must	lie	within	the	cone	of	diversification	i.e.		ሺasx	/	alx		ሻ	൐	S/L	൐	ሺasy	/	
aly	ሻ.	QED	
We know that free trade does not guarantee that everyone will gain due to trade, 
some will and some won’t. But gainers should be able to bribe losers. Problem is that 
such compensation is not enough to tackle rising inequality due to trade. This is a 
different parameter which compensation schemes in the context of trade theory 
never took account of. Thus the standard compensation criteria did not have any 
formulation to design distribution-neutral compensation mechanism. We have 
proved that a distribution neutral tax transfer mechanism that guarantees a rise in 
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after tax wage of the skilled worker and maintains the degree of inequality at the pre-
trade level does exist. 
  
	
Progressive Tax 
Now we redo the exercise with a progressive tax that increases with	ݓݏ.	In particular 
we propose a tax elasticity	߳	such that	ݐෝ ൌ 	߳ݓෝ௦	Working through the same process as 
before we get		 	 	 	 	
ݓ෥෡௦ൌ	ݓෝ௦ሺ1 െ ߳ܽሻሺ20ሻ					;	where	ܽ ൌ 	 ݐሺ1െݐሻ	
ݓ෥෡ ൌ 	ߣݓෝ ൅ ሺ1 െ ߣሻሺ1 ൅ ߳ሻݓෝ௦ሺ21ሻ	
ݓ෥෡௦ െ ݓ෥෡ ൌ 	ߣ ௣ො|ொ| െ ߳ሺ1 െ ߣ ൅ ܽሻ
௣ො
|ொ| ߠ௅௬ሺ22ሻ	 	;	ሾby	ሺ20ሻ‐ሺ21ሻ&	substituting		
	 	 	 																																											for	ݓෝ௦andݓෝ	fromሺ3ሻሿ	
Note that with	߳ ൌ 0	equation	ሺ22ሻ	boils down to the case of a proportional tax.	
ݓ෥෡௦ െ ݓ෥෡ ൌ 0	iff	߳ ൌ ߣߠܮݕሺ1൅ܽെߣሻ	ሺ23ሻ	
ݓ෥෡௦ ൐ 0	iff	1 ൐ ߳ܽ	ሺ24ሻ	
1 െ ߳ܽ	 ൐ 0	iff			1൅ܽെߣߣܽ ൐ 1ߠܮݕ																																				
Substituting for	ܽ	and	ߣ	we get	
1 െ ߳ܽ ൐ 0	iff	
௪ೞ
௪ ൐ ൬
ଵ
ఏಽ೤ െ 1൰
௅
௦			ሺ25ሻ	ሾusing	ሺ23ሻሿ	
Note that condition	 ሺ25ሻ	 is exactly the same condition required in the case of 
proportional tax. 
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Section 3:     A General Perspective and Conclusion 
We started with the question whether one can design a compensation mechanism 
that not only protects absolute income of those who are adversely affected by trade, 
but also guarantees that the degree of inequality remains unchanged at the autarchic 
level and at the same time those who gain from trade continue to enjoy a higher 
after-tax income. We have used a standard HOS type model with skilled and 
unskilled labor and a trade induced rise in skilled wage and a decline in unskilled 
wage to show that without increase in the tax rate, the rise in skilled wage will not 
give enough resources to keep inequality under control. However, a tax rate 
proportional or progressive will always exist which, if implemented, will serve the 
purpose. Inequality will remain the same and skilled workers would still gain.  
This result modifies the well-known Pareto ranking hypothesis which does not 
consider rising inequality while making welfare comparisons. One must compensate 
the losers more than what is needed to keep them on the same level of real income as 
before as inequality will be on the rise. The simple workhorse of trade theory shows 
that even such compensation can be designed through a transfer from gainers.  
 Marjit and Sarkar (2016 ) show that for any actual distribution that indicates an 
increase in aggregate value of the relevant attribute across agents relative to the 
original , one can construct a counter factual distribution which is distribution 
neutral compared to the original distribution and guarantees greater value for 
everyone. Thus gains from trade theorem or higher growth of income will guarantee 
such outcome with a proper tax-transfer mechanism. This inequality preserving 
efficiency result is coined as Strongly Pareto Superior (SPS) allocation. Thus the 
present work represents a case of a more general proposition. In this paper we do not 
deal with aggregate welfare but with aggregate wage income. But one can easily 
recast the analysis in terms of aggregate income/ welfare following Marjit and Sarkar 
(2016). We discuss the case with aggregate income. The case with welfare will 
proceed in the same manner. 
Note that aggregate income must increase under trade as aggregate labor income, 
skilled plus unskilled, is nothing but aggregate value of output PX + Y and as terms 
of trade improve the change in income is captured by dP.X>0, after using the simple 
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envelope property and with dP>0. As total value of labor income goes up, one can 
design a tax-transfer mechanism, following Marjit and Sarkar (2016), that is 
distribution neutral and guarantees higher income level to both types of workers. 
Such a value of tax/ transfer is solved by setting the counter factual degree of 
inequality between the skilled and the unskilled exactly the same as the autarkic 
inequality. Once that transfer is determined, one needs to impose the condition that 
after tax and transfer both skilled and unskilled workers are better off. This boils 
down to the condition that the aggregate labor- income must be higher, which is true 
under free trade. This is an alternative way of solving the problem. 
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